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Abstract: The Italian co-operative enterprises have prospered in the last thirty years in 
various sectors. In this essay we analyze the role played by managerilization in allowing 
Italian co-ops to compete nationally and internationally with capitalist enterprises. On 
the basis of a substantial set of company histories and managers interviews, we have 
built a three generations model of co-ops managers, which shows the changes that have 
allowed co-ops to become fully equipped with managerial skills. The strong leadership 
of umbrella organizations, the inner careers of most managers and legislation have been 
instrumental in avoiding demutualization, the killer of co-ops in many other countries.
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1. Introduction
Is a “co-operative manager” different from a manager tout court? In 2003 David 
Griffith addressing this question highlighted the importance for executives to be fully 
aware  of  the  co-operative  specific  commitments  and  skills.  The  debate  about  co-
operative managers distinctive status emerged in the first decade of the new millennium 
in the wake of de-mutualization of many co-operatives in the United States and in other 
countries (Battilani, Schroeter 2011). According to many observers, managers had been 
playing a leading role in the conversion of co-operatives into capitalist enterprises. For 
instance, in 2003 Tayler in his research on the demutualization of UK building societies 
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concluded that in many cases management played an active role in demutualizing their 
societies. Based on this evidence, he suggested demutualization to be inevitable when 
management  does not defend mutuality.  Cook et al.  (2001) and Stephens (2001) gave 
several examples of senior managers making large short term financial gains as a result of 
demutualization,  including  payouts  or  increased  salaries  in  the  new enterprise.  Finally, 
Hind  claimed  in  1999  that  in  the  later  stages  of  their  life  cycle,  agricultural  co-
operatives, having become larger and more market oriented, were stimulated to satisfy 
the aspirations of managers, rather than those of farmers. Thus the main problem for the 
survival of co-ops seemed to have become the conflict between managers and members.
For anyone with a little familiarity with the history of co-operative enterprises, it 
is easy to appreciate  the distance to this  debate that  characterized the seventies  and 
eighties. At the time, scholars preferred to concentrate on the lack of management skills 
within co-operatives and the impossibility of the latter to attract good executives from 
investor  oriented  enterprises  (IOE),  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  The first  reason is  the 
nature  of  co-operative  enterprises,  in  which  managers  are  chosen  by  members. 
According  to  this  view,  elected  management  will  always  lack  authority  to  impose 
discipline upon their constituency (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Secondly, we have to 
mention  the social  and cultural  background of members,  who prefer  the family-like 
atmosphere  of  small  companies  to  the  hierarchical  organization  of  big  business  (J. 
Rothschild-Whitt,  1979).   Another  reason  is  given  by  the  egalitarian  instances  that 
affected managers’ remuneration and therefore made co-operative unattractive for the 
IOE executives.  Over the past three decades, all the previous concerns related to the 
lack of proper management in co-ops have vanished, being replaced by a completely 
new problem, the lack of co-operative culture among the new managers.  Actually, the 
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former  line of  analysis  (lack of  appropriate  management)  is  still  important  in  some 
developing  countries,  like  India  and  the  African  states.(Satgar  and  Williams  2008; 
Nkhoma and Conforte 2011; Jan and Trehan 2009-2010)
As economic historians, we cannot avoid enquiring what has produced such a 
radical change in the study of co-operative management, a question that we will address 
focusing on the Italian case. Italy is among the advanced countries having experienced 
in the last 30 years a successful growth of co-operative enterprises, which have been 
able to modernize and compete with national  and international  capitalist  enterprises. 
The explanation of this positive performance is complex and includes legislation, which 
has allowed co-ops to strengthen their capital assets1; culture, which has induced many 
Italians  to  prefer  co-operatives  to  capitalist  enterprises2;  market  structure,  which  is 
largely made up of small businesses not giving rise to large concentrations of capitalist 
economic power;  managerialization. In this essay we will concentrate on a discussion 
of this  last  component  of the Italian  co-ops success,  availing  ourselves  of  the large 
number of histories of companies and of their networks we have produced in the past 
years. 
The essay will first give an overview of the evolution of Italian co-ops, to clarify 
which type of growth has taken place; in the second section we will analyze the changes 
in managers' selection and training and their impact on managerial practices inside co-
ops; in the third section, we develop three examples of the role played by managerial 
1  Co-ops have received a specific mention in article 45 of our post II world war Constitution, which was 
approved in 1947 and is still in force today. 
2 It  is interesting to note that co-ops were supported by all the Italian cultural matrices, socialist (and 
communist later), catholic and liberal. The liberal matrix was  present in a party which, being in favour of 
changing the institutional setting of the Italian State into a republic,  was named “republican”, keeping 
that name even after the monarchy was abolished in 1946.
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practices in the life of major co-ops, to give flesh to our typology, with an attention to 
make use of co-ops acting in different economic sectors. The final section will draw a 
few conclusions. 
2. Evolution of the Italian co-operative enterprises after World War II
The study of Italian co-operative enterprises history has been made difficult by a 
dearth of macrodata, which we have tried to fill with ad hoc research, without being 
able to set up a comprehensive overall long term picture yet. The results of our efforts to 
the present day have appeared in a recent publication (Battilani and Zamagni,  2010) 
and,  although  many  gaps  are  still  left,  they  are  unequivocal  in  locating  substantial 
growth since the 1970s, both in number of co-ops and in their economic strength. From 
some 10,000 co-ops in 1951, which remained stable until 1971, we have 66,000 co-ops 
today; from 2% of total employment in 1951, still at that level in 1971, we are today at 
7%. A detailed picture of the economic situation of Italian co-ops in 2009 can be seen in 
table  1.  We  have  put  together  the  accurate  data  of  three  out  of  the  five  umbrella 
organizations  (the  other  two  are  pretty  small  and  not  much  willing  to  supply 
information). As in Italy it is possible to use the co-operative form of enterprise without 
being part of any umbrella organization, we had to produce a guess of the economic 
features of these practically unknown co-ops for completeness, keeping in mind that no 
important  co-op  is  using  this  option,  because  umbrella  organizations  provide  many 
services to their associates. The guess is a very conservative one, so the total cannot be 
overstated.
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 Table 1. The Italian cooperative movement in 2009a
No. of 
co-ops
Turnover
(billion Euro)
Members Employment
(direct)
Legacoop 15,500 57 8,550,000 486,000
Confcooperative 20,300 61 3,127,000 535,000
AGCI 6,900 7 388,000 71,000
UNCI 7,82b 2c 150,000c 70,000c
Unicoopd 1,000c 0.2c 5,000c 10,000c
Not belonging 15,475e 1.5c 90,000c 100,000c
Total 66,000 129 12,310,000 1,272,000
Source: from official data supplied by the umbrella organizations. The total number of co-ops comes from 
              the Central Office of the  Chambers of commerce and includes farmers and fishermen co-ops.
Notes: a Popular banks are excluded, because they are not legislatively recognized as co-ops on the basis
              of article 45 of the Constitution, although they still have  members with less than .5% of capital
              and the democratic rule one head one vote. In 2009 they number 97, with 1.16 million members,
               83,740 employees and a market share of 15%.
b 2004
c estimate 
d it is the most recently formed umbrella organization, registered 7/05/2004
e The number has been produced as a residual, subtracting the other rows from the total
The important piece of information needed to be able to comment table 1 concerns 
the  five  umbrella  organizations.  They  are  not  divided  according  to  sectoral 
specialization,  as  in  other  countries,  but  according  to  a  different  ideological  origin. 
Legacoop  (born  in  1886)  was  based  on  the  socialist  (later  communist)  ideology; 
Confcooperative  (born  in  1919)  on  the  catholic  inspiration;  AGCI  (born  in  1952) 
gathered  co-operators  of  liberal  faith;  UNCI  (1975)  was  a  splinter  from 
Confcooperative, Unicoop (2004) is too recent to share in this sort of characterization 
(and not much is known about it). The latest piece of news to this regard is that the three 
strongest organizations have formed in 2011 the Italian co-operative Alliance (Alleanza  
delle  Cooperative  Italiane,  ACI)  with  the  aim  of  overcoming  divisions  (no  longer 
understandable,  as  a  result  of  the  recent  de-ideologization  of  public  life)  and  of 
rationalizing  activities.  ACI represents  today the  strength of the Italian  co-operative 
movement. Among the three organizations, while Legacoop and Confcooperative are of 
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similar  size  in  economic  terms,  Legacoop  boasts  the  largest  number  of  members, 
because it associates the overwhelming share of consumer co-operatives. 
There are three additional features of Italian co-operative enterprises that should be 
highlighted to understand the reasons of the solidity of the movement: 1) sectors; 2) size 
of enterprises; 3) networks. As for sectors, Italian co-operatives are present in all sectors 
of  the  economy,  including  manufacturing3,  with  a  leadership  in  retailing  (with  two 
brands  COOP and CONAD covering  1/3  of  the  organized  grocery  market4),  in  the 
construction industry (with three co-ops among the 10 largest Italian companies and a 
consortium CCC which is the largest Italian general contractor), in catering (CAMST), 
in  facility  management  (MANUTENCOOP),  in  insurance  (the  third  largest  Italian 
company  UNIPOL is  a  j.s.c,.  but  fully  controlled  by  co-ops).  Co-ops  also  have  a 
leadership in the delivery of social services, because local authorities have outsourced 
most of the services, but also hold an important presence in other services (logistics, 
transportation, porterage, media, tourism) and in banking, where the group of 422 credit 
unions holds 8% of market share. Finally, co-ops have an extremely important presence 
in the food industry, where they have a market share of ¼, and in agriculture, where co-
ops have a participation of 35% in Gross Saleable Production. It must be added that, at 
the exception of social co-ops, market shares in the North of the country are larger than 
the average, because traditionally co-operation is not well established in the Southern 
3 Manufacturing  is  the  “missing”  sector  for  co-ops  in  the  world,  at  the  exception  of  the  famous 
Mondragon Co-operative Corporation and of some medium size Italian co-ops, like SACMI, which is 
specialized in machinery for the production of ceramics and machinery to bottle beverages.
4 Retail  Co-ops  have  been  excellent  in  organizing  their  wholesale  level,  which  services  also  other 
retailers, controlling 40% of the whole Italian grocery market.
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regions, confirming that Italian co-ops flourish in the economically strongest areas of 
the country, not in the poorest ones.
The  size  of  Italian  co-ops  is  also  remarkable:  co-ops  have  on  average  an 
employment larger than j.s.c. (17 employees per co-op against 14 employees per j.s.c. in 
2001,  the  latest  census  data  available).  Being  a  well  known  feature  of  the  Italian 
economy its small size of business, which had a tendency for j.s.c. since the 1970s to 
become on average even smaller (moving from 71 to 14 employees between 1971 and 
2001), co-ops have not followed in this  trend,  keeping their  average size practically 
constant  within the same dates,  but  strengthening  their  big companies,  which today 
account for 10% of all the largest Italian companies (>500 employees). The evolution of 
the  largest  co-ops  1971-2001  can  be  seen  in  table  2;  after  2001,  the  trend  of 
consolidation of co-ops has strengthened (S. Zamagni and V. Zamagni, 2010).
Table 2. Cooperative enterprises with 500 or more workers*
No. of  enterprises No. of employees
1971 1981 1991 2001 1971 1981 1991 2001
Agriculture 1 3 0 0 2,166 3,815 0 0
Fisheries 2 0 0 0 1,063 0 0 0
Manufacturing 3 7 13 13 1,980 5,065 13,476 16,522
    of which: food proc. 3 7 8 10 1,980 5,065 6,193 13,429
Construction 3 17 15 7 3,344 15,690 12,269 5,943
Trade 5 11 15 16 2,899 9,000 21,804 35,095
Hotels-restaurants 0 2 3 5 0 1,528 3,986 15,555
Transport etc. 8 4 1 17 14,231 2,984 553 11,569
Financial intermediation 6 12 30 24 9,518 21,270 40,707 55,584
Facility  management 
services
0 2 11 34 0 1,468 11,709 57,477
       of which: cleaning 0 1 9 32 0 1,468 9,776 47,150
Health and other services 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3,329
Other social services 0 0 1 2 0 0 1,019 1,685
    Total 28 58 89 121 35,201 60,820 105,523 202,759
Workers per cooperative 1,257 1,049 1,186 1,676
Source: Istat, Censimenti       Note:* Excluding social cooperatives.
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One final feature of Italian co-ops is their tight networking, which we have studied 
in  some  detail  (T.  Menzani  and  V.  Zamagni,  2010).  The  first  instrument  to  build 
networks was the consortium, available already since the beginning of the 20th Century. 
Originally,  consortia  were  horizontal  networks,  that  allowed  co-ops  to  pool  their 
resources to be able to carry on larger activities, while still practicing direct democracy 
in their small companies. Later on, consortia developed also other types of networks, 
but, above all, paved the way to mergers and therefore greatly helped the increase in the 
size of co-ops. In the latest 30 years, another instrument was used, i.e. the formation of 
co-operative groups, encompassing also joint stock companies fully owned or controlled 
by  co-ops.  Groups  tend  to  be  formed  to  control  an  area  of  business  in  its  various 
components. But the Italian co-operative networking is much more than consortia and 
co-operative  groups.  Umbrella  organizations,  beside  formal  representation  of  the 
movement,  form  sectoral  associations,  which  discuss  and  implement  long  term 
strategies, and local associations, which preside over local opportunities; they provide 
financial and professional services and make a strategic use of a fund dedicated to the 
development of co-operation5. They sometime play a role of lender of last resort. 
It is now clear that the management of such a complex system of enterprises had to 
develop appropriate managerial capabilities, to be able to sustain growth. How these 
capabilities were achieved is the central issue of the present article, to which we now 
turn.
3. Change in managerial practices: three generations of co-operators
5 The fund is formed with 3% of the profits of the associated co-ops and is managed centrally by each 
umbrella organization. 
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As we have already mentioned in the introduction,  the setting up of appropriate 
managerial  hierarchies  couldn't  be  given  for  granted  in  cooperative  undertakings. 
Indeed,  for  all  the  seventies  and eighties  the  theoretical  and empirical  research  had 
identified a key weakness in the  low educational levels  and minimal  training of co-
operative members and managers. However, co-operatives could enjoy at least of one 
advantage  over  the  most  widespread  form  of  enterprise  in  Italy,  namely  family 
enterprise: they were not transferring command of the company to sons and daughters.
These  issues  have  been  addressed  in  various  ways  in  the  business  histories 
published  over  the  last  two  decades  (Fabbri  1995,  Battilani  1999,  Zamagni  2002, 
Bertagnoni 2004, Leonardi 2005, Battilani and Bertagnoni 2010; Battilani, Bertagnoni, 
Vignini 2008; Battilani 2011, Zamagni, 2011), but no long-term vision had been worked 
out in the past locating the turning points. In this section we offer a first attempt to build 
a model of co-op managers evolution, on the basis of a plurality of sources: interviews 
(collected partly by ourselves and partly by others researchers); documents stored in the 
company archives at the Documentation Centre for Cooperation in Bologna; research 
carried by the Bologna University group of business historians.
A new dataset of 109 cooperative managers born between 1883 and 1970 has 
been put together. For each manager, we collected the following information: date of 
birth, formal education, career path, ideological background as well as the role played in 
co-ops during their  working life.  Overall,  a dozen business history of co-operatives, 
consortia  and  groups,  have  been  taken  into  consideration:  the  Consumer  co-ops 
(comprehensive of the wholesale co-op and of some of the nine big co-operatives active 
today); Granarolo (number one in the dairy sector); the CNS, National consortium of 
service cooperatives (number three in facility management); the CTA, Food Transport 
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Co-operative (a middle size co-op of truckers), Coind (a co-operative that operates as a 
co-packer); CCC and CMC, (two of the Italian companies leader in the building sector); 
and CAMST (leader  in catering).  Of course this  sample is  not  representative  of the 
entire co-operative world, but it allows the identification of the strategies adopted by 
most successful co-operatives. In other words, it allows to identify what we might call 
the good practices in the training and selection of managers. Regarding the territorial 
distribution,  the sample is unbalanced on the reality of Emilia  Romagna,  but this  is 
partly a consequence of the high concentration of large co-operatives in that region. 
From the sectoral point of view, however, the sample is fairly representative. Only the 
financial  sector  and  social  cooperatives  were  not  included.  Finally,  regarding  the 
umbrella organizations, all co-ops in the sample either always adhered or at some point 
in their life joined Legacoop. Up to now no information of this type is available for co-
operatives connected with the other Italian apex organizations.
Our managers dataset permits us to identify three generations, each of which has 
a strong characterization in terms of formal education and ideological background, as it 
can be seen in the summary table 36. The first generation is represented by those born 
before 1928, who played a leadership role between 1947 and 1954. This is a group 
without formal education: many of them did not get beyond primary school, some not 
6 It is important for our research to distinguish between generation and cohort. The cohort is an aggregate 
of individuals who share a given time period. The generation is  something more and different,  as it 
assumes a common experience (L. Mannheim 1928; N.B. Ryder and Charles F. Westoff, 1965).
10
 
Table 3. Co-operative managers dataset 
Year of birth number Former 
partisans
Work 
experiences 
outside  the 
cooperative 
movement
Primary 
school 
Secondary 
school
Tertiary 
school
Before 1928 28 22 19 13 10 3 
Between 
1928-1944
45 0 17 15 24 6
Between 
1946-1970
36 0 16 0 12 21
total 109 22 52 26 49 29
Source:  Battilani  and Bertagnoni  archive  of  oral  history -  File  "Cooperative  managers";  V.  Zamagni 
database.
even completed it. Most of them had participated in the Resistance against the fascist 
regime,  and  this  experience  became  the  key  element  of  characterization  of  their 
generation. They embraced the idea of a comprehensive transformation of society that 
led them to adhere to the Left parties, look with sympathy to the unions and work in the 
co-operative movement.
Most of them had already matured some kind of work experiences before being 
appointed by a co-op or before becoming the founding members of a co-op. However, 
they built their  career entirely within the co-operative movement,  but not within the 
same undertaking. Very often this generation of managers moved from one co-operative 
to  another.  Equally  common  is  the  working  experience  in  some  branches  of  the 
umbrella organization or in the sectoral associations. Their career path is usually the 
following: they start working very young in a co-operative as assistant, clerk, porter, 
bricklayer  (if  they  have  a  secondary  school  certificate  their  first  work  could  be  as 
assistant accountant), then little by little they become executives in small co-operatives 
or consortia. On the occasion of mergers, some of them can become the chief executive 
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of the new undertaking. To sum up, the first post-war generation of managers was self-
taught, grew up within the co-operative world, shared a common set of values and the 
same vision of the world. 
The recruitment of managers from IOEs was not even contemplated. At that time 
co-ops  and  investor  oriented  enterprises  were  much  more  than  a  different  form of 
undertaking; they were two separate worlds. This is why during the eighties, when the 
Italian historians tried to explain the 1950-1970 co-operative stagnation, they pointed 
their finger against the ideological attitude of co-operative members and managers, in 
particular within Legacoop,  the leftist umbrella organization. The fact of seeing the co-
operative movement  as part  of a broader  process designed to  overturn the capitalist 
economy was deemed responsible for the lack of a proper entrepreneurial culture.
However,  the  lack  of  formal  education  didn't  prevent  this  generation  of 
managers to adopt significant innovations within the undertakings they staffed. Usually 
they compensated for the lack of formal education with a great spirit of initiative and in 
the middle phase of their career they were also able to introduce important changes in 
accounting practices or to initiate innovative experiences on the marketing side. Indeed, 
the updating of accounting standards started already in the mid-fifties. Since 1956 both 
Legacoop  and  the  Consumer  co-operatives  national  association  (ANCC)  tried  to 
stimulate the introduction of these innovations in several ways, also by promoting them 
in the co-operative journals.
“ANCC instructed its officers to spread the use of the budget sheet, at least in middle 
and large size co-operatives,  as  a  tool  to  plan and control  both business  and social 
activity… It was necessary for this purpose to provide a budget model which, while 
conforming to the accounting standard, was well suited to the needs and specificity of a 
co-operative  undertaking.  ANCC  has  therefore  prepared  a  form that  consumer  co-
operatives will have to fill in...In this way it will be possible to remove and minimize 
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the drawbacks and failures of management, giving managers a more timely vision of the 
key business issues and moving a step forward in managing co-operatives...  ”( F. di 
Marco 1956). 
The chart of accounts "in the first place allows to detect at any time the economic and 
financial situation and, by keeping non-accounting operations at a minimum, to quickly 
analyze  the  management  performance  and  evaluate  the  different  cost  components. 
Secondly, it allows  to arrive at  the yearly and semester financial statements that show 
the overall situation of the company.” (Gherpelli 1956).
Granarolo  is  a  very  good example  of  innovation  in  marketing  strategy.  The 
company was set up in the late fifties by sharecroppers and small farmers in order to 
improve the yield of the milk they produced. For over thirty years, the co-operative was 
run by the same men who had created the conditions  for its  birth (Franco Migliori, 
Otello  dalla  Casa,  Nerio  Nobili).  None of  them had a  secondary school  certificate. 
Despite  this,  at  the  end  of  the  sixties  they  adopted  a  very  original  and  aggressive 
marketing  strategy  that  permitted  the  co-op  to  beat  the  investor  owner  enterprises' 
competition  in  the  local  market.  Peppino  Ortoleva  called  it  "the  Italian  way  to 
marketing" (Ortoleva 2004).. Because competitors had more capital and therefore could 
make greater investments in advertising and marketing, Granarolo executives adopted a 
series of low cost ways to introduce their brand to customers. In 1959 their adversiting 
campaign  included  the  printing  of  90.000  promotional  brochures,  the  recording  of 
commercials for cinemas and the painting of the Granarolo logo on the milk transport 
vans.  However,  the  truly  innovative  idea  was  to  appeal  to  social  solidarity:  they 
organized  promotional  meetings  among  the  members  of  all  the  socialist  inspired 
associations, co-operatives and even political parties of the left in the province. Besides, 
always  with a  view to strengthening the relationship  with the surrounding area,  the 
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Granarolo managers invited school children and workers of neighboring companies to 
visit  the  plants  and  brought  milk  to  the  workers  on  strike  (Interview  with  Franco 
Migliori). When in the early seventies the co-op began to expand in the markets of other 
provinces, the same marketing strategy was chosen (Granarolo Archive, Minutes of the 
Board of Directors).
Even if most of them were self-taught, there were also exceptions. As shown in 
Table 1, three executives of that age were graduate. Most of them were engineers or 
surveyors that had built their careers in the CCC. The CCC founded at the beginning of 
XX century experienced a first development in the interwar period surviving to fascist 
takeover and even the WWII. Since the earliest days, the consortium began to recruit 
graduates because in the building sector engeneerings or surveyors were necessary to 
sign  the  projects.  The  graduates  were  recruited  during  the  Fascist  period  and  kept 
working in CCC even at the end of World War II, as they had been able to keep distance 
from the prewar regime (Fabbri 1995).
In  conclusion,  the  “Renaissance”  of  co-operatives  that  followed  the  second 
world war in Italy was driven by two distinct group of managers: the "young", who 
came for the partisan struggle, and " the old", who had been recruited in the previous 
decade, but were able to keep distance from the fascist government. The latter often had 
a higher level of formal education than the former. 
The second generation is represented by those born between 1928 and 1944. 
Usually they started to work in a co-operative after 1950 and became executives during 
the seventies. For reasons of age they didn't take part in the Resistance, but continued to 
be  united  by  the  same  values  of  the  previous  generation  and  strengthened  their 
solidarity  and  common  vision  through  membership  of  the  Italian  left.  From  our 
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perrspective,  the  most  interesting  feature  is  that  this  generation  included  a  higher 
percentage of managers with secondary school certificates. The recruitment of young 
people  who  had  completed  secondary  school  was  both  a  choice  of  individual  co-
operatives  and the result  of  a Legacoop campaign (Battilani  1999;  Interviews with 
Valeriano Masotti and Luciano Sita).  In fact,  in the early fifties Legacoop started a 
program designed to spread accounting skills and methods among its associates, and to 
encourage  accountants  to  join  the  co-operatives  and  the  co-operative  federations. 
Therefore,  accountants,  surveyors  and  agronomists  were  appointed  in  Italian  co-
operatives and one decade later a new generation of executives emerged among them. 
During  the  seventies  and  the  early  eighties,  they  led  the  introduction  of  many 
organizational and accounting innovations within the largest co-operatives. But above 
all, they were the protagonists of  the enlargement of Italian co-operatives.
We can  report  as  an  example  the  case  of  Conad,  the  Consortium of  Italian 
retailers co-ops.  In the seventies the latter was run by Luciano Sita, an accountant who 
had  been  recruited  immediately  after  his  diploma  by  a  buying  group  associated  to 
Conad (Mercurio). In the history of this consortium, 1975 is a watershed, because it 
marks the end of spontaneous growth and the beginning of a phase of planned growth of 
the entire network of the retailers' buying groups (Conad Archive, Comma 42, 1976). In 
that year,  together with the National Association of Retailers  Cooperatives (ANCD), 
Conad worked out a plan of mergers throughout the country in order to increase the 
average size of the existing buying groups. (Conad Archive, Comma 57, 1977; Comma 
77, 1979).  Mergers continued without interruption during the eighties and contributed 
to the creation of a system of "market oriented co-operatives" of middle and large size 
(Conad Archive, Annual report 1977-1986). 
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The  generation  of  accountants,  surveyors  and  agronomists  brought  a  truly 
entrepreneurial  culture  within  the  co-operative  movement,  even if  this  didn't  spread 
evenly in all sectors. While consumer and food processing co-operatives led the process 
of renewal, the agricultural ones failed to follow suit.  Little by little,  the entry of  new 
generations of managers created a new co-operative culture based on a unique blend of 
market  logic  and  the  former  anti-capitalistic  culture,  as  expressed  by  communist 
ideology or by a section of the Catholic world. It is clear that by the end of the 1950s, 
within  the  “red” co-operative  movement  there  was  already a  desire  for  growth  and 
expansion,  for  the  capitalization  of  co-operative  enterprises  and  for  the  creation  of 
networks and consortia. But this desire seemed often in contrast with the values and 
ideals upon which the movement had been founded. In the end, the socialist/communist 
brand  of  co-operative  enterprises,  as  represented  by  Legacoop,  was  forced  to 
compromise  on  the  principle  of  equality  in  order  to  introduce  a  more  meritocratic 
approach to  the remuneration  of  labour,  and to  overcome worker-based  outlooks  in 
order  to  create  more  room  within  co-operative  administration  for  technicians  and 
managers. This path, which was embraced between the 1950s and 1960s, was based on 
two beliefs: first, that successful cooperatives had to be created and managed in order to 
confirm  the  ideals  of  the  cooperative  movement;  second,  that  the  co-operative 
movement’s task was to create large-scale cooperative enterprises capable of beating the 
capitalist monopolies present in the Italian market of the time. 
Even if  in  our  essay  we don't  deal  with  the  transformation  of  co-operatives 
which belonged to the Catholic umbrella organization, it is worth mentioning that they 
also  showed  an  interesting  change  during  this  period.  In  the  Catholic  world,  the 
emphasis upon family had always implied a lesser importance being placed upon the 
16
 
individual.  In the nineteenth century, this vision materialized in the form of restrictions 
upon the membership of cooperatives: for example, the by-laws of many of the local co-
operative  banks  provided  for  the  membership  of  the  head  of  the  family  only,  or 
excluded women from the co-operative. During the years following the Second World 
War,  the  focus  on  the  family  was  particularly  clear  in  the  farming  sector,  where 
Catholic co-operation expressed a clear preference for ‘collective family ownership’, 
and where the head of the family continued to be the prominent figure, as the owner of 
both his own labour and of that of his family members,  and thus was considered as 
having a right to remuneration for his own labour and for that of his family members. 
This vision of the family, in which only the head of the family was granted full socio-
economic recognition, was to be abandoned gradually, as other members of the family 
became  increasingly  visible  from both  the  economic  and  the  social  point  of  view. 
Agricultural cooperatives were gradually replaced by food processing cooperatives, the 
members of which were now individual peasant farmers, regardless of their family ties, 
gender or status.
As a consequence of the mergers wave we mentioned above, since the seventies 
and even more in the eighties several  large size co-operatives  emerged;  all  of them 
required complex  managerial  skills.  It  was at  this  stage that  the third  generation  of 
managers, those born at the turn of the forties and fifties, became active; with it we have 
the first massive entry of graduates, usually soon after graduation.  They develop their 
careers  fully  within  the  cooperative  movement,  sometimes  employed  by  the  same 
enterprise, in other cases through vertical mobility that allows them to be recruited by 
larger size undertakings or by the umbrella federation. In services, mobility,  through 
which these generation built their career paths, also includes Trade unions, because the 
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social skills they acquired in such organizations were found of value for the enterprise, 
above all in the human resource management function. Usually graduates took leading 
positions within the managerial hierarchy since the late eighties.
Once  again  it  is  easy  to  identify  a  clear  strategy  by  Legacoop,  which,  by 
stimulating the recruitment of graduates, tried to increase the level of formal training of 
future leaders. The process was particularly apparent in well established co-operatives, 
because  they  had  already  defined  their  managerial  hierarchy.  For  instance,  in  the 
Alleanza Cooperativa Modenese (today Coop Estense, one of the nine large consumer 
co-ops) since the late seventies more than 60% of managers were graduate (Battilani 
1999).  Usually,  they  were  recruited  as  white  collars  or  mid-level  managers,  but 
sometimes  (above  all  in  co-operative  facing  some  kind  of  difficulty)  they  were 
immediately entrusted with leadership roles. 
However, some sectors stayed behind. Often in the newly formed co-operatives 
the educational profile of both members and executives was lower. During the seventies 
there was a new wave of services co-operatives coming into being. The most dynamic 
sectors were cleaning and transport. The founding members of the new co-operatives 
were cleaners,  porters,  truckers  and so on.  Usually  they were founded by men and 
women from lower classes and with low levels  of schooling.  In these undertakings, 
managers often shared the social backgrounds and the formal education of members. An 
example  of  this  type  of  situation  comes  from  the  history  of  the  Food  transport 
cooperative (Cta) which was founded in 1977 by 28 truck drivers, average age 34 years, 
most with only primary school, without money and in many cases even without trucks. 
The first president, Bartolini, born in 1941, was of the same age of the other members 
and could not afford to continue his education after primary school. (Interview with 
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Bartolini).
The  third  generation  of  co-operative  managers,  regardless  of  its  formal 
education,  is  very different  from the  previous  one  in  terms  of  vision.  Their  shared 
experience is no longer the Resistance, but the epic of 1968, interpreted in at least two 
ways, as it emerges from the interviews: on the one hand the protest and the political 
commitment  to  social  progress,  on  the  other  hand  the  commitment  to  acquire  a 
university degree. For many of them to get a degree was a priority, because they wanted 
to reward their family for the sacrifices made to send them to school. Generally, their 
families  of  origin  belonged  to  the  lower-middle  strata  of  society:  sharecroppers, 
proletariat  or  urban underclass.  For  them,  co-operation  is  both a  secure  job and an 
opportunity for social mobility. With the arrival of graduates, the corporate culture of 
co-ops changed deeply, little by little. The major changes began to be seen in the late 
eighties  and early  nineties,  especially  in  the  larger  co-ops.  Among  the  many,  three 
changes were of particular importance: the adoption of a multidivisional organization, 
the introduction of differential wages for executives and low/mid-level managers and 
connected to this  the narrowing of wage differentials  between co-operative and IOE 
managers. 
Once again the umbrella organization played a crucial role. In the mid-eighties 
Legacoop addressed the problem of giving greater transparency to the remuneration of 
executives.  A survey conducted in 1988 by Corum (the consulting company set up in 
1987 by the Modena provincial branch of Legacoop) revealed that co-operatives paid 
their middle managers lower salaries than those prevailing in private companies, and 
that the same was true when it came to senior management. On top of this, there was no 
discontinuity in the promotion from employee to executive. Finally, the variable wage 
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components connected  with  incentives  and  premia  was  missing  (Coind  Archive, 
mimeo). 
The solution was found with the importation of the Hay job evaluation scheme 
from  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries.  According  to  this  model, company  positions  and 
rewards were classified according to the importance of the duties performed7.  In this 
way, the rewards were differentiated on the basis of an objective criterion, and more 
precisely on the basis of the tasks and responsibilities of each manager or white collar 
workers. The change was driven by consulting companies.  As a matter of fact, in the 
late  eighties  many  provincial  branches  of  Legacoop  fostered  the  setting  up  of 
consulting companies, like  Corum  (in 1986) and  Smaer (in 1985) in Emilia Romagna, 
which could buy the rights of the Hay method for Italy and help in the application of it 
among co-operatives by offering consultant services.
To better understand how this transformation emerged we will mention the case of 
COIND (a small co-operative producing food and chemical goods) in the mid-nineties. 
As stated by the President of the time:
"the problem arose from the fact that every time we tried to appoint from the market a new 
manager, we had to give him a larger salary compared with those who were already working 
with us. This was a very embarrassing situation. At one point it seemed appropriate to raise 
our executives and white collars wages. (Interview with Vincenzo Alberti). 
Following the suggestions of Corum consultants and consequently adopting the Hay 
scheme,  white  collars  and  managers  were  divided  into  different  groups  and  a 
7 The  Hay  Guide  Chart  Profile  System  had  been  developed  in  the  United  States  in  the  periods 
immediately before and after the Second World War. It was designed specifically to cover administrative 
and managerial jobs in large organizations. Hay was first used in the UK financial sector, then applied 
also to many other sectors. The scheme was amended in the late 1990s to accommodate local government 
manual jobs.
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correspondence  between  tasks  and  remuneration  was  fixed.  On  average,  wages 
increased  by  300  euro  per  month  (Coind  Archive).  At  the  same  time,  part  of  the 
executives remuneration was linked to the co-operative performance. The co-operative 
chose  a  group incentive  payment  scheme to  avoid  negative  effects  on  the  business 
climate and internal co-operation8. (Interview with Luigino Franco). At the end of the 
process, the share of the cost of white collars and executives over the total cost of labour 
increased  from  18%  in  1995  to  26%  in  1999.  (Coind  Archive,  Human  resource 
deparment).
The  managers  remuneration  issue  should  be  placed  in  a  wider  context  of  co-
operative organizational renewal, which required the creation of appropriate managerial 
hierarchies.  During the eighties, following, once again,  the suggestions of consulting 
companies,  many large  co-operatives  started  to  organize  their  managerial  hierarchy 
according to the multi-divisional structure. This was the case for instance of Camst, 
Granarolo and Coind. Results were not always positive straight away, because in some 
cases the organizational  transformation led co-operatives  to  excessively increase the 
number of managers and white collar workers, but subsequently they rationalized. 
All these changes gave rise to an interesting innovation that began to emerge in the 
late   nineties,  namely  the  recruitment  of  executives  from private  companies.   The 
similar remuneration, the disappearance of the antagonistic vision of co-operation and 
the greater uniformity in business practices created the conditions for a more frequent 
passage of executives from the private sector to the co-operative sector and vice versa.
It  is  at  this  last  stage  that  a  problem of  cooperative  identity  emerges.  It  could  be 
possibile to talk about a fourth generation of cooperative managers with a very good 
formal  education  but  not  fully aware of  the  co-operative specific  commitments  and 
8  Ibidem
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skills. 
4. Selected case studies
In this section, we offer three case studies of major co-operatives, that show that the 
process we have modelized above was not so linear and was carried through with great 
discussions and some tensions. The first case deals with a construction co-op created in 
Ravenna  in  1901  by  bricklayers,  CMC  Cooperativa  Muratori  e  Cementisti,  (V. 
Zamagni, 2011). The co-op rapidly became large, but soon split into two co-ops as a 
result  of  ideological  divisions  (socialists  on  the  one  side,  liberals  on  the  other). 
Forcefully merged again during fascism CMC was reorganized in the years immediately 
following the end of World War II under the hegemony of communist members, not 
without major ideological conflicts with the socialist and liberal members who remained 
inside the co-op9. In the 1950s still, the co-op was made up of bricklayers and it was 
forbidden to  accept  as members  white  collar  workers.  Engineers  when needed were 
appointed as consultants, whereas some surveyors were employees of the co-op. The 
size of the co-op at that time was around 1,500 workers, of which 1,000 members (all 
bricklayers), and activities were conducted in a very informal way. The first important 
decision taken was that of formalizing the organization of the co-op with a new statute 
approved in 1960, which among other things determined roles and tasks of middle rank 
managers, reintroduced the director general and expressed a preference for higher level 
managers to hold a university degree or at least a secondary school certificate. 
These decisions allowed the strategies of the co-op to become more aggressive and, 
above all, new markets could be tapped. First, CMC engaged in the construction of silos 
9  Some of these left and created another construction co-op, ACMAR, still active at present.
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with  a  new technique  coming  from Sweden;  next  it  entered  the  buoyant  market  of 
motorways and dams, plus the building of industrial plants (with special attention to 
electrical and ecological plants), of  large residential quarters and of high quality public 
buildings. It next developed expertise in the construction of channels for undergrounds, 
high speed trains, deviation of rivers, construction of canals. CMC became a general 
contractor.
This meant a vast increase in capital investment, the use of prefabs and the need of 
many  more  blue  collar  workers,  who  could  no  longer  be  considered  a  marginal 
component of the co-op. A heated discussion brought in 1972 to the admission of blue 
collar workers as members, while between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 
1980s the problem of remuneration of managers was faced, recognizing their different 
role inside the company and overcoming the old egalitarian approach10. In 1981 the first 
president who was not a bricklayer,  but an accountant,  was elected and an engineer 
became  director  general.  The  opening  up  of  CMC  to  international  activities  was 
inaugurated in the mid-seventies, when director general was still a surveyor and many 
middle rank managers were self made bricklayers, but it was later carried on all over the 
world (mostly in the Middle East, Africa and Asia) by people with a university degree. 
Increasingly, both in Italy and abroad, co-op members came to play the role of project 
designers and directors of works, with a high level of human capital,  making use of 
local bricklayers wherever they win a tender, appointed for the period of completion of 
the work. Today CMC has a turnover of 800 million Euros, about 8,500 employees 
10 Before the 1984 agreement, what was done was to grant to the blue collar workers an additional sum on 
top of the standard pay for skilled workers. After 1984, in any case,  remuneration of managers in CMC 
has never reached capitalist levels. 
23
 
around the world, but only 500 of them are tenured, of which 373 are members of the 
co-op.
The successful managerialization of CMC was suffered inside the co-op and outside 
it  in the co-operative  movement  as a  process that  would decrease the level  of self-
governance by the part of members. Memorable fights were taking place in the general 
assembly, in the board of directors meetings and in public discussions to keep control 
over managers by the part of members. The solution, which had to be found empirically, 
was the setting up of committees  of members  that  should be consulted at  all  levels 
before decisions were taken by managers.  In the end,  it  worked, and in 2011, 110th 
anniversary of the CMC, it can be said that this is one of the most successful examples 
of a co-op capable at the same time of competing nationally and internationally on a par 
with  capitalist  organizations,  while  having  a  different  ownership  structure  and 
practicing a governance based on economic democracy. 
A second example comes from Bologna and deals with a catering co-op, CAMST, 
which is the largest Italian company in the field, competing with French multinationals. 
CAMST was created the 16th June 1945 by 16 waiters, cooks and barmen, to face the 
severe unemployment existing at the end of the war (Camst, 2002). Various restaurants, 
(mostly self service), snack bars and bars were soon opened up, the most famous of 
which was the snack bar-self service restaurant at the Bologna railways station, which 
served people from all over Italy and from abroad11. In the 1960s Camst entered the 
business of catering inside exposition premises and of banqueting; in the 1970s it started 
catering for schools, hospitals, companies and other communities. In the same 1970s 
Camst branched out in other areas of Northern and Central Italy, directly or through the 
acquisition  of  other  co-ops  or  joint  stock  companies,  trying  also  to  explore  foreign 
11 Bologna is an important railways hub.
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locations (Croatia and Germany).  It next promoted the diffusion of meal vouchers in 
Italy  and  more  recently,  it  is  developing  gastronomy  for  large  scale  retail  chains, 
networking especially with the two COOP and CONAD local chains. Camst today is a 
group of 20 companies, some of them joint stock companies controlled by the co-op, 
with a turnover of around 900 million Euros, more than 11,000 employees and more 
than 6000 members.
Unlike CMC, which chose over time to leave manual workers outside the structure 
of the co-op, given the temporary life of their construction sites, CAMST has been able 
to keep them inside, because of the stability of their employment  over time, but the 
strategic decisions taken in the 1970s to move out of simple restaurant activities and 
manage preparation of meals for large communities entailed the decision to strongly 
managerialize  the  co-op.  Already  in  the  1950s  CAMST  employed  a  number  of 
accountants with a secondary school degree, who had put in place a detailed budget 
control of each point of sale. In the early sixties the accounts were mechanized thanks to 
the electronic devise Mercator by Olivetti and a detailed cost analysis was introduced. 
During the seventies, the attention was focused on the organizational structure, with the 
creation of the first managerial hierarchy. In 1974 a functional organizational structure 
was  put  in  place  with  two  distinct  departments  (accountancy  and  production); 
moreover, a separate division was set up for coordinating and managing travel agencies. 
The multifunctional organization was substantially kept until the mid-eighties, when the 
expansion into new geographical areas stimulated the adoption of the multidivisional 
form.  More precisely,  in 1984 three divisions were set  up using an approach which 
mixed geographical and sectoral dimensions. This structure was particularly effective in 
assisting the co-op expansion, because usually mergers and acquisitions of companies 
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and  other  co-ops  gave  birth  to  new territorial  divisions.  Of  course,  every  time  the 
organizational  structure  was  changed,  new managerial  skills  needed  to  be  inserted, 
something that was done in a timely way.
We move now to the consideration of consumer co-ops. As mentioned in section 1, 
the COOP chain is the  most important group acting in large scale retailing in Italy. In 
2010 it is made up of 115 co-ops, with 7.5 million members, 1,444 points of sale (of 
which 100 hypermarkets). Nine of the 115 co-ops are very large, accounting for 92% of 
total  turnover  (which  amounts  to  13  billion  Euros,  18.3%  of  market  share).  (V. 
Zamagni,  P.  Battilani,  A.  Casali,  2004).  One  of  the  nine  major  co-ops,  UNICOOP 
TIRRENO, is under scrutiny today by one of the authors of the present paper, with the 
aim  of  analyzing  its  latest  less  than  satisfactory  performance.  The  opportunity  is 
particularly welcome to discuss here the issue of managerialization in a not entirely 
successful case.
UNICOOP TIRRENO was born in 1945 in Piombino (Tuscany) with the name LA 
PROLETARIA12 as one of the numberless consumer co-ops created in Tuscany, where 
there was a very widespread direct  participation of common people into their  co-op 
shops, existing in cities as well as in the very many small villages of the country side. 
As economic  development  touched upon Tuscany during the  economic  miracle  and 
beyond, some of these co-ops developed into more substantial companies, taking over 
the shops of the less dynamic co-ops. LA PROLETARIA, which was one of the largest 
local co-ops, happened in the 1970s to acquire as a budget controller an accountant with 
a secondary degree who was very intelligent and capable13. He first strengthened the co-
12 It was created by the steel workers of the Piombino factory, hence the name “The Proletarian”.
13 He complained in the interview he granted to Vera Zamagni of never having been recognized formally 
as “director general”, as a result of the egalitarian ideology prevailing inside that co-op.
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op along the coast of Tuscany14 concentrating a number of the small shops acquired into 
supermarkets and then he conceived the idea of enlarging the co-op outside Tuscany, 
first  in  Latium and  next  in  Campania,  with  the  support  of  the  national  association 
ANCC, which considered positively the diffusion of consumer co-ops in the South of 
Italy.
Both  new regions  were  entirely  different  in  terms  of  consumer  co-op tradition, 
Latium showing a  weak propensity  to  support  co-ops  and Campania  an almost  non 
existing one. Therefor, in most cases the new points of sale (often hypermarkets) were 
top down rather than bottom up decisions and could neither count on collaboration from 
local  members  nor  on  indication  of  suitable  locations.  On  top  of  this,  the  inner 
organization  of  LA  PROLETARIA,  which  in  1990  changed  its  name  in  COOP 
TOSCANA LAZIO, was ill suited to plan such a major development in unknown areas. 
The few existing managers were very local,  the points of sale were all smallish, the 
chairmen of the co-op used to consider their appointments as non operative, the strong 
man of the co-op acting almost in isolation and on the basis of his personal contacts.
In 1996 this unsatisfactory state of affairs started to be under attack and in 1997 the 
management was changed, but major decisions about new locations for hypermarkets in 
Latium and in Campania had already been taken, underestimating the big jump from 
managing  local  small  size  shops  in  areas  where  co-operation  was  spontaneous  and 
having to  support  big  structures  as  the  hypermarkets  in  places  that  had never  been 
accustomed  to  the  co-op  presence  and  that,  like  Campania,  even  showed  aversion 
against a co-op seen as a factor of disturbance of the existing economic “order”15. The 
new management, although better equipped than the previous one, felt inadequate and 
14 Florence and Siena are under see the presence of another co-op, which is the largest in Italy, UNICOOP 
FIRENZE.
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started to lean on consultants, appointing as a director of the hypermarket joint stock 
company created on purpose somebody who had run a capitalist premise and had never 
worked in co-ops. Efficiency improved, but none of the real problems of the co-op – 
mostly wrong locations and inadequate specialization in running large premises – was 
solved,  while  the co-op identity suffered deeply and the budget turned into the red. 
After a few years, the learning process by the part of co-op managers went far enough to 
be  able  to  master  the  situation.  The  name  of  the  co-op  was  changed  in  2004 into 
UNICOOP TIRRENO, un-co-operative managers were dismissed,  some of the worst 
locations were sold out, other mergers were arranged with local small consumer co-ops, 
synergies and specificities of the various different activities were re-arranged; the co-op 
is now on its way back to equilibrium, running in 2010 110 points of sale, among which 
seven hypermarkets, with 850.000 members and a turnover of 1.2 billion Euros.
How was it possible to redress the situation? The umbrella organization Legacoop 
with its sectoral association ANCC was helpful in advising, in showing management 
models (employed in other more successful large consumer co-ops) and in lobbying 
when necessary with various institutions, but above all the co-op enjoyed the support of 
the members of its Tuscan cradle, who willingly deposited their savings with the co-
op16,  supplying an important source of liquidity for investments.  Also, the managers 
who directed the co-op since 1997 were thoroughly dedicated to their  company and 
15 One of the IPERCOOP TIRRENO hypermarkets in Campania had to be closed down twice, because of 
pretentious administrative problems raised by the local “camorra” affiliates. Another hyper could open up 
only after the entire city council of the place was removed from office and the city politics was put under 
a government commissioner.
16  It must be noted that the Italian legislation allows co-ops (not only consumer co-ops) to attract deposits 
up to a fixed amount, with a remuneration at a premium with comparison to market rates, to be used to 
finance co-ops development plans. 
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determined to come to terms with the problems; though they still made mistakes, they 
learned from them and encouraged younger generations to strengthen their professional 
background, while remaining fully aware of co-operative principles.
5. Final remarks
In conclusion we would like to offer some broader consideration. In a recent paper 
Franco Amatori skeched the typologies of entrepreneurs that emerged from the history 
of industrial Italy (Amatori 2011). Even if in his essay he doesn't take into consideration 
co-operative managers, it is worth asking where they can be situated in his typology. 
From  many  points  of  view,  co-op  managers  can  be  considered  similar  to  the 
entrepreneurs operating in the "industrial districts". This is true above all for the first 
generation of co-operative managers.  However,  because co-operatives  don't  face the 
traditional  constraints  to  growth  encountered  by  family  firms,  the  successive 
generations  of  co-op  managers  could  more  easily  enlarge  the  enterprises  they  ran. 
Indeed, over the last two decades some big and innovative enterprises have emerged 
from the myriads of co-operatives. Paradoxically, we can conclude by saying that the 
managers  of the biggest  co-operative groups have been in  the last  decades  the best 
example of market-oriented entrepreneurs in Italy, what Amatori calls the “Milanese” 
typology of entrepreneur.
This  leads us to a second remark, namely the organizational isomorphism of co-
operatives.  According to some contributions,  co-operatives couldn't avoid starting an 
isomorphic trend, though often non congruent to their inner identity, because they aimed 
at  getting  legitimacy  from  society,  from  markets  and  from  financial  institutions. 
(Hawley 1968, Meyer 1979 and Fennell 1980). According to Meyer (1979), the need for 
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efficiency and competition is the driving force of organizational innovation and explains 
the growing homogeneity of organizations. Can we say that the modernization of Italian 
co-operatives has been an example of institutional isomorphism?. To be able to answer 
this question, it is helpful to reflect on the material gathered in this essay.  Managerial 
skills  have always been crucial  for the success of co-operative undertakings as they 
were for IOEs. However, historically this problem has been particularly pressing for co-
ops, because they have been a vehicle for the “have-nots” to improve their standards of 
living through organized self-aid. As a consequence, many co-ops have been set up by 
low income people without  formal education. This is why in the seventies and eighties 
when the viability of co-ops became an important issue, the attention of many scholars 
focussed on the lack of managerial skills. In many countries the co-operative movement 
became  aware  of  this  weakness  rather  early.  The  Italian  cooperative  umbrella 
organizations  where  at  the  forefront,  so  that  since  the  fifties  they  stimulated  the 
enrolment  of  employees  with  secondary  school  certificates.  The  acquisition  of  new 
managerial  skills came from the entry of young people,  rather than from appointing 
senior  IOE managers  from the  outside.  However,  the  Italian  umbrella  organizations 
never tried to imitate the English experience of the Co-operative College and preferred 
to rely on the courses of study offered by the Italian public schools and eventually on 
master courses organized by some prestigious private universities. In the eighties, even 
a scent of America started to spread among co-operative executives, with the adoption 
of the Hay scheme.
In  most  dynamic  co-operatives  the  modernization  of  both  the  organizational 
structures and accountancy required no more than two decades. It started certainly later 
than in the largest Italian corporations of the time, but in many cases it anticipated the 
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updating in middle size companies. Overall, the creation of managerial hierarchies and 
the  modernization  process  forced  co-operative  enterprises  to  compromise  on  some 
values. For instance, the leftist part of the movement had to accept the mitigation of the 
equality  principle  in  order  to  introduce  a  more  meritocratic  approach  to  the 
remuneration of labour.
However,  the adoption  of models  developed by IOE enterprises  has not  been so 
passive. All the generations of managers we considered were aware of the co-operative 
specific commitments and skills.  In some cases, the co-operative identity was turned 
into a strength, in other cases it influenced the organizational form. Suffice it to recall 
here the marketing strategy of Granarolo. We can also point out that in the construction 
of  multifunctional  or  multi-divisional  organizational  structures  the  relationship  with 
members  and  the  management  of  human  resources  were  assigned  a  strategic  role. 
Usually,  these  functions  were  not  confined  into  a  department  but  remained  the 
responsibility  of  top  managers.  We  can  therefore  say  that  the  organizational  form 
confirmed the crucial role of workers and members in the co-operative enterprise. What 
emerged at the end  was an original mix of market oriented attitude and co-operative 
values.
Nevertheless, at the end of all these changes a problem of co-operative identity did 
emerge, without leading to demutualization for a variety of reasons. The legislation up 
to 2003 prevented demutualization and even after 2003 made it difficult, because the 
new  demutualized  company  cannot  carry  with  it  the  capital  accumulated  by  the 
predecessor co-op as indivisible assets17.  On top of this, most of the managers even 
today have a career inside the co-operative movement (often moving from one company 
17 In case of demutualization, indivisibile assets must be conferred to the umbrella organizations for the 
development of co-ops activities.
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to  another),  which  induces  them  to  be  attuned  with  the  co-operative  identity  of 
companies. Finally, the strong leadership by the umbrella organization Legacoop, which 
spread best  practices  and helped overcoming crisis situations, is also helpful for the 
preservation of co-operative values.
It  is  however  fair  to  say that  the  problem of  coherence  with  their  co-operative 
identity of co-operative groups having many joint stock companies inside the group is 
not  entirely  overcome.  If  Italian  co-operatives  want  to  continue  their  life  as  co-
operatives, they need to envisage a cultural  renewal and support  the revision of co-
operative  principles  in  the  present  day  context  with  investments  in  research  and 
education.
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